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Altruism is reflected in actions by one individual 
that benefit another, even when there is no expec-
tation of reward. Altruism is often equated with 
selflessness and contrasted with selfishness, or 
alternatively, altruism is seen as other-regarding as 
opposed to self-regarding behavior. The latter 
usage is sometimes preferred because of difficulties 
in classifying behavior for which the individual 
acting altruistically receives a "warm glow" from 
helping others. The question raised in th is instance 
is whether such an individual is a tua ll y el.fish 
and, if so, whether there is any behavior that, afrer 
the fact, could not be interpreted as selfish. 
The need to preserve altruism as a meaningful 
behavioral category leads to an emphasis on objec-
tive, observable measures of welfare. Thus, an 
individual who sacrifices health, material wealth, 
or physical comfort to benefit another can be 
viewed as exhibiting altruism whether or not he or 
she receives personal satisfaction from doing so. In 
biology, altruism refers to behavior by an organism 
that improves the reproductive fitness of another 
at the cost of reducing the reproductive fitness of 
the actor. This entry discusses altruism as it has 
been explained and defined over the years. 
Explaining Altruism 
Philosophers and behavioral scientists continue to 
ask whether humans have innate tendencies 
toward altrui m or whether proclivities in th t 
dire rion arc rhc result of ocia l.izatic n or accu l-
turation alone. ne view is that any such behavior 
i purely the conseque11 e of a thin veneer of civi-
lization." Rend that fabric, and humans wi ll b at 
each other's throats, tearing each other apart· for 
the ~lighte r advantage. 
On see thi - in Sigmund Fr ud ~s wo rk (e.g., 
iuilization and Its Discontents)i in literature 
(Robert lding' Lord of the Flies) and in much 
trad itional ocio logy and anthropology. The prob-
I m with rh i view is that, based on the archeol gi-
ca l re o.rd, it i difficu lt to push the ability c: f 
lwrn ::rn and their pr genito r to develop and 
transmit culture across generation fur tb r back 
than 0,000 years or, at a maximum (ha ed on 
vid nc f the use of fire) perhaps 1 million 
year . Language abi lit ies are a lmost c rtainly 1T1uch 
me re recent. And yet the common ancestor of the 
three , urviving himpanzee species-Homo sapi-
ens Pan troglodytes (the c mmon chimp)) and Pan 
paniscus (bonobos)-who li ved rough ly 7 mi llion 
year ago, must have exercised som restraint on 
hMming oth r mem ber of th ame specie 
(conspe ifics). 
By far them st important aspect of altruism a 
Al x:and r J. Field points out in hi s b k 
/\ltruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, 
volutionary Theory, and the rtgms l 
Reciprocity i not harming oth rs wh 11 doing so 
an be justified defen ively (as a means of for sta ll-
ing ·1ttack) and, further as a means of acquir ing 
more res urc s. In most instance ·, on an onfer 
mu h greater ben fits by not barming ·mother as 
opp ·ed ro affirmatively helping. 
ne of th key rea lm within which to observe 
altrni 111 i the family. Evolurionasy biologi ·ts 
approa h the phen men n of altruism geneti a ll y, 
viewing individual organjsm a , in a sense, enve-
lopes r v se l for genes. Genes th mselve have no 
theory of mind or independent voli tion, but the 
theory of natural selection rell.s u that :renes pred i -
posing toward behavior that increase th ir fre-
qu n y in subsequent generations she uld he favored. 
In m t case , the " interests" f the gene in 
increa in Tits fr qu n y over tim and t he interests 
of the organ ism in survival and rep rod uction are 
the same. But n t I way , and that, from a bi )[ gi-
cal p rspective i the problem of altruism . uppose 
gene pr disp cowa rd behavi.or that might 
reduce the survival probabilities or reproductive 
success of the individual while helping another. 
How could such genes gain a foothold and increase 
in frequency within a population? 
In the 1960s, William Hamilton proposed an 
elegant solution to the problem of explaining how 
such genes could become established. It is a com-
monplace observation that parents are often pre-
pared to sacrifice their material welfare or, in some 
cases, even their lives, for their children. Because 
biological children share half the genes of a parent, 
a gene predisposing to sacrifice could increase in 
frequency if such behavior tended to lead to the 
survival of at least two offspring ( or two siblings 
or eight first cousins and so on). 
Hamiltonian kin selection is today widely 
understood as a key part of the explanation of 
altruism within families. In other words, tenden-
cies toward parental sacrifice have a hardwired 
component; they are not purely a cultural con-
struct. Indeed, such behaviors can be observed 
throughout the animal kingdom, including among 
species that do not have the ability to develop and 
transmit culture. 
The more difficult challenge is to explain altru-
ism beyond the immediate family. Genetic related-
ness drops off quickly-first cousins share just an 
eighth of each other's genetic makeup-so even in 
the small bands of 50 to 100 hunter-gatherers out 
of which human society emerged, kin selection by 
itself is too weak a force to explain the emergence 
of the cooperation essential for group survival. 
Cooperation is not the same as altruism, but it 
depends on altruistic predispositions in order to 
get started. Why? Because a self-regarding indi-
vidual not already embedded in a fabric of recipro-
cal interaction faces a Prisoner's Dilemma, that is, 
the dilemma of deciding whether or not to cooper-
ate (e.g., refrain from attacking) when confronting 
a stranger for the first time. Attacking first and 
asking questions later has much to recommend it 
from the standpoint of both prudence and wealth 
maximization. The worst outcome would be to sit 
tight and be attacked (since offense often has an 
advantage). The best for each individually would 
be to attack while the other sat tight. 
The next best outcome (and the best for the two 
individuals considered jointly) would be to refrain 
mutually from attack, which would open up the 
possibility of beneficial cooperation and exchange. 
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The next-to-worst outcome would be for each to 
attack the other. The dilemma is that the best 
response to whatever the other does is to attack, 
even though this leads away from the outcome 
that is collectively the most beneficial. 
Influence of Genes 
It is easy to understand how gene(s) predisposing 
toward attack might be favored, particularly if 
being attacked while sitting tight means death. It is 
more difficult to understand how genes favoring 
restraint could be favored. Several approaches 
have been proposed. The first is to argue that the 
restraint necessary to allow initial cooperation 
among those not closely related is simply an exten-
sion of the operation of kin selection within small 
groups. But this involves a certain amount of hand 
waving since, as has been shown, genetic related-
ness falls off too quickly for this to be a complete 
explanation of how the behavior originated. 
The second approach is associated with the 
work of Robert Trivers, who developed the theory 
of reciprocal altruism. Here, the idea is that if A at 
small cost can confer a large benefit on B, then B, 
being grateful, might at some small cost return the 
favor at a subsequent point. But this does not 
explain why a self-regarding B would not simply 
take the initial benefit and run. Nor, since A should 
figure this out, does it explain why he or she would 
initially bear the small cost of helping. Assuming no 
selection higher than the organism level, one would 
expect evolutionary forces to reinforce this 
calculus. 
Game theorists understand that once individu-
als are embedded in a fabric of reciprocal interac-
tion, self-regarding individuals may find it to their 
benefit to continue cooperation. The problem of 
explaining the origin of cooperation is distinct 
from the challenge of explaining why it might be 
sustained. Altruism (in the form of restraint on 
harm) may be necessary to initiate a cooperative 
relationship, but once embedded in a social con-
text, the behavior can appear drained of altruistic 
context. As Adam Smith said in The Wealth of 
Nations, people do not depend on the benevolence 
of the butcher or the baker for their sustenance but 
on his self-interest. 
A third approach acknowledges that in the evo-
lutionary past, natural selection may have 
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operated at levels above the individual organism. 
The possibility of group or multilevel selection 
remains controversial within biological discourse, 
but many evolutionary biologists, including some 
wbo originally distanced themselves from the idea, 
such as E. 0. Wilson, have now embraced the view 
that it provides the most coherent explanation of 
how the altruistic predispositions that favor human 
cooperation among non-kin could, upon first 
appearance, have been favored. 
Proponents of group or multilevel selection do 
not dispute that the gene is the ultimate unit of 
selection. But they seek to extend the principle, 
acknowledged uncontroversially in the case of kin 
selection, that in certain instances, genes predispos-
ing toward behavior not in the survival or reproduc-
tive interest of the organism containing them might 
nevertheless be favored by selection pressures. 
In the case of kin selection, the argument is 
simple and straightforward. In the case of genes 
predisposing toward restraint on harming others 
who are not closely related, the mechanics are 
more complex. If human populations are dispersed 
in small groups and if there is some random varia-
tion in the frequency of genes predisposing toward 
restraint, groups characterized by higher frequen-
cies of such genes will likely grow more rapidly. 
And if the groups periodically pool and then reas-
sort into smaller groups, the apparently paradoxi-
cal conclusion is that genes losing out in terms of 
reproductive fitness at every moment of time in 
every group may nevertheless increase over time in 
a global population. 
Final Thoughts 
The history of mankind is of course marked by 
horrendous violence and the premature deaths of 
hundreds of millions of individuals at the hands of 
other hwnans. Unprovoked preemptive attack is a 
feature of hw11a11 '1u.-tory . .At the same time, one 
can look at a wo rl d of more than 7 billion indi-
viduals and marvel not at the extent of conflict but 
at its relative infrequency, which is one of the rea-
sons conflict is newsworthy. Is this entirely the 
result of a thin veneer of civilization or culture, 
and, if so, why were and are individuals prepared 
to accept some of these norms? 
It is likely that humans have, in addition to their 
proclivities toward self-regarding behavior, some 
hardwired predispositions toward altruism. The 
most empirically significant are those leading to 
restraint on harming others. There is also a some-
what weaker predisposition toward affirmatively 
helping others, including those who are non-kin. 
Eacb of these predispositions can be strengthened 
or weakened by training or acculturation. 
Research in social psychology has demonstrated 
that humans are quick to divide conspecifics into 
in-groups and out-groups, with members of an 
in-group most likely to benefit from both types of 
altruism. These categorizations are, however, 
malleable. Identifiable ethnic or racial markers 
play a role, but culture can be as important. This is 
a reminder that, although much behavior, including 
that predisposing toward altruism and selfishness, 
has a genetic and biological substrate, culture and 
socialization are important influences on how 
these predispositions manifest themselves. 
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